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FOREWORD
This In-Space Propellant Logistics and Safety Study was performed by the
Space Division of North American Rockwell Corporation for the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration, Marshall Space Flight Center, under Contract
NAS8-27692. The study was a twelve-month effort initiated on June 25, 1971,
and completed on June 23, 1972.
The study was conducted as two separate, but related projects. One project
addressed the systems and operational problems associated with the transport,
transfer, and storage of cryogenic propellants in low earth orbits, while the
other project addressed the safety problems connected with in-space propellant
logistics operations. Correlation between the two projects was maintained by
including safety considerations resulting from the System Safety Analysis in the
trade studies and evaluations of alternate operating concepts in the Systems/
Operations Analysis.
Walter E. Whitacre of Marshall Space Flight Center, Advanced Systems
Analysis Office, was the Contracting Officer's representative and provided
technical direction to the overall contract and to the Systems/Operations
Analysis project; Walter Stafford of the same office provided technical direction
to the System Safety Analysis project. The contractor effort was under the
direction of Robert E. Sexton, Program Manager; the Systems/Operations Analysis
effort was led by Robert L. Moore and the System Safety Analysis effort was led
by William E. Plaisted.
This document is Volume I of the following three volumes which contains
the results of the System Safety Analysis:
Volume I
Volume II
Volume III
Executive Summary
System Safety Guidelines
and Requirements
System Safety Analysis
(SD72-SA-0054-1)
(SD72-SA-0054-2)
(SD72-SA-0054-3)
The results of the Systems/Operations Analysis portion of the study are
contained in the following five volumes:
Volume I
Volume II
Volume III
Volume IV
Volume V
Executive Summary
Technical Report
Trade Studies
Project Planning Data
Cost Estimates
(SD72-SA-0053-1)
(SD72-SA-0053-2)
(SD72-SA-0053-3)
(SD72-SA-0053-4)
(SD72-SA-0053-5)
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The NASA space program plan (1975-1995) has many elements including
space-based vehicles for transporting payloads from low earth orbit to
geosynchronous, lunar, and planetary orbits. These space-based vehicles
would require large quantities of propellants (primarily liquid oxygen and
liquid hydrogen) and an in-space propellant logistics element to provide
earth-to-earth orbit transport, earth orbital storage, and in-space transfer
of these propellants. Many of the routine operations required of the pro-
pellant logistics system are undeveloped and are potentially hazardous. A
vital step in the successful execution of the space program plan is the con-
duct of a system safety analysis of the propellant logistics operations. This
has been accomplished using the study approach of Figure 1.
This Executive Summary presents the significant results of the safety
issues identified from the hazard analysis of the propellant logistics concepts
and operations.
STUDY Mooa
• 7 CONCEPTS
LOGISTIC
OPERATIONS
o DEPLOYMENT
• DOCKING
• TRANSFER
• RETRIEVAL
179 HAZARD
ANALYSIS
PREVENTIVE
MEASURES
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• PROCEDURAL
SAFETY
GUIDELINES
AND
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16 SAFETY CRITICAL
OPERATIONS
Figure 1. Study Approach
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1.1 STUDY OBJECTIVES
The three main objectives of the study are the following:
1. Examine from a system safety viewpoint the in-space propellant
logistics elements and operations to define the potential hazards
and recommend means to eliminate, reduce, or control them.
2. Conduct trade studies of specific propellant logistics systems
or operations to determine the safest of alternate approaches.
3. Develop safety guidelines and requirements which would be applicable
to future in-space propellant logistics operations.
1.2 SCOPE
The study scope covered the propellant logistics elements shown in
Figure 2.
Initial system safety analysis
tasks were based on the depot, the
large storage facility (LSF) concept
developed on the Orbital Propellant
Storage System Feasibility Study
(Change Order 1980, NAS7-200) com-
pleted in March 1971.•C3TUG
CIS
DEPOT
INS
CENTAL*
FROKLLANT
TANK.
MOOUU
H D >
LARGE rtOff LLANT
TANK MODULE
OkHTa
Figure 2. Propellant Logistics Elements
New propellant logistics con-
cepts developed for the In-Space
Propellant Logistics Study (refer
to SD 72-SA-0053-1 through 5) were
also included in the system safety
analysis. These concepts involved
the delivery of propellants by
shuttle or expendable second stage
(ESS) direct to the tug, chemical
interorbital shuttle (CIS), and
reusable nuclear shuttle (RNS),
which eliminated the need for a
large storage facility.
Additional concepts added per NASA request were propellant delivery by
shuttle to a modular user vehicle and propellant delivery by shuttle to
another shuttle in orbit.
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Ground rules for the study were as follows:
• Hydrogen and oxygen were propellants considered.
• Only unique ground operations were considered.
• Study emphasis was concentrated on earth orbital propellant
logistics operations.
1.3 RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER STUDIES
The In-Space Propellant System Safety Study was performed in the context
of a wide range of related studies. This relationship is shown in Figure 3.
NR/SD
DOWNEY
SPACE
SYSTEMS
APPLICA-
TIONS
1971 1972
SHUTTLE ORBITER
OPSSl
TUG OPS POINT DESIGN
IN-SPACE PROPELLANT LOGISTICS
SAFETY IN EARTH ORBIT
CHEMICAL IMTERORBITAL SHUTTLE
I ORBITAL OPERATIONS STUDY
I SHUTTLE/PAYLOAD INTERFACES
OTHER SAFETY STUDIES
LOCKHEED
AEROSPACE
Figure 3. Relationship to Other Studies
changed to the drop tank version,
to both concepts.
The key studies were the con-
current effort of the In-Space Pro-
pellant Logistics Study and the
Orbital Propellant Storage System
Study completed in March 1971,
which provided concepts and oper-
ations for the In-Space Propellant
System Safety Analysis.
System and interface operation
and functional flow data from the
Phase B shuttle study were of
particular significance. The shuttle
concept was initially based on the
integral tank orbiter and was later
The results of this study are applicable
Phase A studies on the tug, orbit-to-orbit shuttle (OOS), and point design
tug provided information for the safety evaluation of propellant transfer and
shuttle cargo bay operations involving small user vehicles.
Other concurrent studies which provided a basis for a good interchange
of information were safety in earth orbit, chemical interorbital shuttle, and
orbital operations. In all the concurrent studies the interchange of
information and ideas flowed in both directions.
Safety information was obtained from the Lockheed (shuttle) and the
Aerospace Corporation (orbiting propellant depot) studies. The latter study
was of particular significance for the safety evaluation of propellant storage
concepts.
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1.4 METHOD OF APPROACH
The study approach illustrated in Figure 1 shows the development and flow
of data throughout the study.
A space program model was established for the system safety analysis of
in-space propellant logistics operations. It was the intent to establish a
model which involved all conceivably credible propellant logistic operations
for the space program elements shown in Figure 2. The model included the
following propellant logistics concepts:
1. Baseline (Figure 4) - Delivery of a propellant module in the shuttle
cargo bay to an orbital propellant depot (OPD), which is a large
earth orbital storage facility (LSF). Fluid transfer of propellants
utilizes rotational acceleration for propellant settling.
2. Delivery of a propellant module in the shuttle cargo bay to one
orbital altitude and transfer of the propellant module to the large
storage facility at a higher altitude using the space-based tug
3. Delivery of a large quantity of propellants directly to the CIS/RNS
using the shuttle booster with expendable second stage (ESS) as the
transport mode
4. Delivery of a propellant module in the shuttle cargo bay and fluid
transfer of propellants directly to a space-based tug
5. Delivery of a propellant module in the shuttle cargo bay and fluid
transfer of propellant directly to a CIS/RNS
6. Delivery of a propellant module in the shuttle cargo bay and modular
transfer of propellants directly to a modular user
7. Delivery of propellants in the shuttle cargo bay and modular or fluid
transfer of propellant directly to another shuttle in orbit
- 4 -
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CIS/SNS USB
ROTATION USED
FOR PROPELLANT
SETTLING
The logistics
operations involved
with these concepts
were evaluated by
using functional
flow diagrams and
the safety-critical
operations were
identified. Catas-
trophic or critical
propellant-related
hazards associated
with these oper-
ations were analyzed
and preventive
measures and safety
guidelines and
requirements were
developed. Those Figure A. Baseline Concept
hazards which could
not be reduced by preventive measures below the level of critical were classi-
fied as residual hazards. These residual hazards were identified as areas for
additional study effort.
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2.0 BASE DATA GENERATED AND SIGNIFICANT RESULTS
The 7 concepts of the study model were analyzed and 16 safety-critical
operations were identified (Table 1). A total of 179 hazard analyses were
performed and 15 propellant logistics hazards for deployment, dockinp, trans~
fer, and retrieval operations were determined (Table 2); 384 preventive
measures and 63 guidelines/requirements were developed to eliminate, reduce,
or control these hazards. The scope of effort for the system safety analysis
and the significant results, recommendations, and conclusions for the deploy-
ment, docking, transfer, and retrieval operations are presented in Sections 2.1
through 2.4. The results of the special safety issues for abort and use of
slush hydrogen are presented in Sections 2.5 and 2.6, respectively.
Those hazards which cannot be reduced below the level of catastrophic or
critical remain as residual hazards and are discussed in Section 2.7. Safety
evaluation trade study results of propellant logistics concepts are presented
in Section 2.8.
2.1 DEPLOYMENT
In propellant logistics operations, the orbiter will have a requirement
for deploying a .propellant tank module or tug from the cargo bay. The two
deployment mechanisms considered for these operations were manipulators and
rotational deployment mechanisms.
Potential hazards for the study model deployment operations were
identified and hazard analyses were performed.
CONCLUSIONS
• The movement (sloshing) of the fluids (up to 60,000 Ib) in the tanks
during deployment of propellant logistics elements from the cargo bay
with manipulators is a hazardous condition which can lead to impact
of an element with the orbiter.
• The long manipulator arms with the propellant tank module attached
are more susceptible to disturbances of sloshing or propulsive leakage
(100- to 200-lb thrust) than the rotational deployment mechanism plus
the module because of the weaker structural attachment to the orbiter
and the greater deflection potential.
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Table 1. In-Space Propellant Logistics Safety Critical Operations
""— — -»^0peratlons
Concept " *^^_
1 Baseline
2 Orbiter/tug/LSF
3 Booster/ESS/large
propellent tank
4 Orblter to orbiter
6 Orblter to CIS/RNS
7 Orblter to modular
Deployment
Propellant tank module
deployed by manipulators
from cargo bay (±\
.
deployed by rotational —
«l«plc.,..nt rn.ch.nls.
Propellant tank module
and manipulator
mechanisms X~N
v_y
Docking
module to LSF /^N
Remote hard dock CIS to LSF Q
Remote hard dock tug/module
to LSF Q
Remote hard dock of large propellant
tank with CIS/RNS Q
module to CIS/RNS fo
Transfer
R t f 1 1 ti f
CIS/RNS - orbiter unattached/^
"
at QD with use of mani-
pulators Q\
Positive displacement method
used for propellant
transfer fg\
ation for propellant (Ji)
attached (12)
Linear acceleration for CIS/
RNS/tank module propellant
settling with orbiter not
at tached /T]\
Capillary f lu id control for
CIS/RNS/tank nodule propellant
transfer >Oi
Retrieval
deorblt of orbiter f$\
Table 2. Propellant Logistics Operations Hazards
Hazard
1. Sloshing
2. Loss of vehicle control
3. Impact
4. Dynamic coupling
5. Failure of line interconnect fixtures
6. Loss of e.g. control
7. Thermal shock
8 . Cont aminat i on
9. Fire/explosion
10. Uncontrolled venting
11. Loss of liquid/vapor interface control
12. Leakage/mass spill
13; Loss of communications
14. Loss of pressurization control
15. Degradation of manned element
Deployment
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Docking
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Transfer
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Retrieval
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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During removal of the propellant tank module from the cargo bay with
manipulators, movement of the fluids (LH™, LC>2) because of erratic
operation of the manipulators or the RCS would result in sloshing and
would increase the potential for the impact hazard.
The manipulator control operator's ability to respond to fluid
disturbances is a constraint on the safety of the deployment
operation.
Jettisoning a malfunctioning manipulator which has many failure
configurations presents more risk to the orbiter than the ejection
of a faulty rotational deployment mechanism.
RECOMMENDATION
The rotational mechanism is recommended for deployment of the
propellant logistics element from the cargo bay.
2. 2 DOCKING
The safety aspects of docking operations between propellant logistic
elements of varying sizes and with quantities of propellant from 50,000 Ib
to 1,000,000 Ib were evaluated to determine the preferred approaches from a
safety point of view. The options of soft docking with manipulators and direct
hard docking were considered.
Potential hazards for the study model docking operations were identified
and hazard analyses were performed.
CONCLUSIONS
• Docking maneuvers are approximately impulsive and propellant
excitation due to docking impulses cannot be avoided and a small
period of erratic motion can be expected.
• The direct hard docking system has the greatest potential for
inadvertent collision because of the proximity of the docking
vehicles. The manipulator docking system has the minimum potential
for inadvertent collision between vehicles because of the relatively
large separation distance at initial capture, but has more failure
modes which can result in inadvertent contact and damage.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Direct hard dock of propellant logistics elements is not a
recommended propellant logistics operation because the vehicle contact
impulse could produce excessive fluid oscillations.
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Damping constraints shall be designed into the propellant logistics
system, which will prevent excessive fluid oscillations.
Soft docking of propellant logistics elements is a recommended
propellant logistics operation because the vehicle contact impulse
at controlled velocities of 0.1 ft/sec or less will not produce
excessive fluid oscillations. A combination of manipulator and probe
operation will meet the soft docking requirements.
A combination of both manipulators and a rotational deployment
mechanism is the recommended safety concept for propellant logistics
deployment and docking operations (Figure 5).
Figure 5. Deployment and Docking Concept
2. 3 TRANSFER
The safety aspects of propellant transfer operations were evaluated for
concepts involving rotational acceleration or linear acceleration for propellant
settling. The transfer options with the orbiter attached and not attached
were considered.
Potential hazards for the study model transfer operations were identified
and hazard analyses were performed.
CONCLUSIONS
• Slosh problems during rotational acceleration are due to tumbling type
instability (change in axis of rotation), rolling, spinning or coning
motion, or propellant motions induced by spinup and spindown.
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• Slosh problems during linear acceleration are due to excessive pitch
and yaw attitude or attitude rate changes and rolling, spinning,
coning, or translational motions.
• Problems due to propellant sloshing are:
1. Premature uncovering of the source tank outlet
2. Inability to assure liquid-free venting
3. Use of excessive RCS propellants
4. Inability to control within the desired band
5. Structural failure
• Slosh wave amplitude decreases with the increase in the g field.
• High transfer rates will aggravate the slosh problem.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Rotating the vehicle for propellant setting should not be done with
configurations whose spin axis changes from major to minor or vice
versa during propellant transfer. Ideally, the spin axis should be the
major axis at all times.
• Source tank sloshing excited by receiver tank sloshing shall be
alleviated by placing baffles or screens in the source tank and vice
versa.
• Slosh forces shall be controlled by design and operation to a level
below the attitude control authority of the propellant logistics
system.
2.4 RETRIEVAL
In propellant logistics operations, the orbiter will retrieve the pro-
pellant tank module or tug and deorbit it to earth in the shuttle cargo bay
(Figure 6).
Potential hazards for the study model retrieval operations were identified
and hazard analyses performed.
CONCLUSION
Propellant logistic elements may be returned to earth in the shuttle
cargo bay if propellants have been dumped and leakage is within
specifications.
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INSULATION PURGE BAG VENT
AMBIENT PRESSURE VENTS
•LEAKAGE POINTS
PROPELLANT TANK VENTS
PROPELLANT FILL AND DRAIN/DUMP
CARGO DOORS OPEN IN ORBIT
SHUTTLE CARGO BAY (REF);
LEAKAGE POINTS
FREE CARGO BAY VOLUME -* GROUND GN2 BAY PURGE
Figure 6. Tug Emplaced in Shuttle Cargo Bay
RECOMMENDATIONS
• The design of propellant logistics elements shall eliminate the
possibility of mixing propellants in any space where the combination
could reach pressures of 2 mmHg or greater.
• Propellant logistics elements shall have the capability to dump
liquid propellants prior to deorbit and reentry in a manned vehicle.
• Leak checks shall be performed on propellant logistics systems to
verify that leakage is within tolerance prior to fluid transfer or
prior to reentry in the shuttle cargo bay.
• A means shall be provided to verify that the fluid lines of propellant
logistics elements are connected and that leakage at the interface is
within specifications.
• Propellant modules that have been depressurized to vacuum shall not
be returned in the shuttle as long as solid propellants remain in
propellant tanks. Solidified particles of propellants on module or
cargo bay surfaces shall not be deorbited but delayed until solids
have sublimed. Worst case delay for the shuttle will be several
hours if the bay is oriented for maximum heating.
- 12 -
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During the preparation for shuttle deorbit, the tank pressure of the
propellant logistic element must be verified to be within structural
limits under atmosphere pressure conditions before committing to
deorbit. Tank collapse when the orbiter reaches the atmosphere
could cause massive leaks of hydrogen that would mix with atmospheric
oxygen inside the cargo bay and be ignited by heat, shock, or catalytic
action and lead to loss of the orbiter and crew. If the tank pressure
cannot be verified to be acceptable, it shall not be returned in the
shuttle.
The residual propellants in the tanks shall not be greater than the
amount that could be vented without overpressurizing the tanks if all
liquids were suddenly converted to gas by contacting hot spots on the
tank walls.
2.5 ABORT
Emergency abort conditions occurring during delivery of a propellant
logistics element to orbit in the shuttle cargo bay were evaluated. The abort
regimes are shown in Figure 7. Mode 1 covers a booster failure during the
period from liftoff to the time before the shuttle reaches once-around abort
capability. Mode 2 covers a shuttle failure with once-around abort capability.
The principal conclusions and recommendations are:
• In case of shuttle suborbital abort, the propellant logistics element
shall have the capability to safely dump propellants to meet the
40,000-lb landing limitation in the minimum time available for
propellant dumping.
• AffllOX STAGING TIME
Am*
ONE
OXMT
MOM I - BOOSTER FAILURE - 200-300
' ORBITER FUGHT TIME - DUMP LOX
MODE 1 - ORBITER FAILURE - ONE ONCE
AROUND ORBIT CAP - DUMP & SAFE
TUG TANKS
FLIGHT IEGIME
CEC)
MOOC 1
*I40*
MOOE2
»MO*
AFTEt STAGING
FUGHT TIME
TO LAND
PK)
200-300
6000
PROPELLANT
DUMP
AMLITY
• LOX CAN K
DUMPED
• LHjWIU*
KEPT ON
tOAU)
• IOTH LOX
AND LH2
CAN BE
DUMPED
(TtMEREQ'D
TO DUMP
IOTH
Z7MINS)
SAFETY
CONSIDERATIONS
• DUMP LOX
• SAFETY HAZARD
WITH LH2 DUMP
IN ATMOSPHERE
• SAFEST ABORT
POSSIBLE
\
DOWN RAMGE Sin
Figure 7. Abort Regimes
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• Propellant logistics elements in the shuttle cargo bay which contain
both L£>2 and LH2 shall dump only the LC>2 under suborbital abort
conditions and dump both propellants under once-around abort conditions,
2. 6 SLUSH HYDROGEN
One of the safety considerations during the study was the delivery of
slush hydrogen for use in space-based vehicles. Slush hydrogen (SI^ ) is a
mixture of small solid hydrogen particles and liquid hydrogen which can be
transferred much like a liquid. The mixture offers the advantage of
substantially increasing the bulk propellant heat capacity which potentially
results in reduced boiloff losses. Additional advantages of slush hydrogen
are an increase in bulk density, which suggests a smaller storage tank, and
lower tank storage pressures, resulting in reduced pressurization gas require-
ments. The most efficient use of slush hydrogen would be with large space-
based vehicles such as the CIS and RNS, which have long storage times in space.
The principal conclusions and recommendations for safety in the use of
slush hydrogen are:
• An insulation failure on the long line runs from the slush facility
or on the propellant tanks in the shuttle cargo bay during the fill
operation could result in heat leaks that would melt solid fractions.
The melting solid would expand and overflow the tank. One pound of
LH2 forms 194.5 ft^ of gas at 25 C and 1 atmosphere with a volume
change of 860. This high volume flow in long vent lines could
reflect high backpressures into the propellant logistics module
and overstress the tank.
• Any transfer operation involving slush hydrogen must have the flow
through the transfer lines exceeding the critical velocity at all
times. Below this velocity the solid particles will settle out of
the liquid and may cause line blockage at a restriction in the systems,
• Propellant logistics systems that utilize slush propellants must be
capable of operating with varying solid fractions.
• Slush hydrogen should not be used with propellant settling capillary
devices because the solid particles may restrict or block the
capillary channels.
2. 7 RESIDUAL HAZARDS
Catastrophic and critical hazards encountered in propellant logistics
operations were identified and analyzed. The objective of preventive measures
was to reduce these hazards to at least marginal and preferably negligible.
After the application of the preventive measures, if the hazard still remained
at a catastrophic or critical level, then the hazard was residual.
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Included in the 33 identified residual hazards are:
• Propellant leakage or venting into cargo bay - The accumulation of
hydrogen at or above the critical concentration level of 4% by volume
in the cargo bay would be catastrophic to the orbiter and crew.
• Unknown propellant quantity - The lack of knowledge on the quantity
of propellants for mission completion, RCS action, and orbiter landing
weight could result in loss of mission, orbiter, or crew.
• Sloshing disturbances - Overall vehicle dynamics is critical to the
success of propellant logistics operations and any factor such as
sloshing or propulsive leakage that could lead to the loss of
stability is a residual hazard.
• Negative tank pressure - Tank implosion would introduce combustible
gases into the cargo bay and be catastrophic to the orbiter and crew.
• System failure vehicle docking - A failure in any one of the several
systems involved could introduce critical hazards.
• Reduction of vision - The provision of retractable shields to reduce
the formation of ice on visual aids reduces the hazard from
catastrophic to critical. The finite reaction time for the operator
to actuate the controls still leaves the chance that some clouding
would occur and results in a critical residual.
2. 8 TRADE STUDIES
One of the objectives of the system safety analysis was to conduct trade
studies of candidate systems, concepts, and modes to recommend the safest of
the options. Safety evaluations for propellant transfer were made for four
tug concepts, four CIS/RNS concepts, a modular CIS/RNS concept, and an orbiter-
to-orbiter concept. In these propellant logistics transfer operations, the
orbiter may be attached or it may be at a standoff position. It was concluded
that the safety requirements for the combined configuration are greater when
the orbiter is attached. Having integrated the man-compatibility requirements
into the attached systems, the significant consideration is the time the
orbiter crew will be committed to the transfer operation.
SAFETY EVALUATIONS OF FOUR TUG PROPELLANT TRANSFER CONCEPTS
The trade study conclusions and recommendations for the four tug
propellant transfer concepts shown in Figure 8 and Table 3 are:
• Concept A, in-bay rotation, is the safety preferred concept
because the module is not deployed from the bay and mating and
demating operations at the orbiter interconnect fixture interface
are eliminated.
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B
Concept B, deployed SHUTTLE ATTACHED
rotation, and Con-
cept C, deployed lin-
ear, have increased
impact hazards.
Concept B, deployed
rotation, and
Concept C, deployed
linear, are both
acceptable concepts.
Concept D, separate
linear, is the only
concept with the
orbiter not Figure 8.
attached during
propellant transfer.
It is an acceptable concept with a safety rating below Concept A
because of increased deployment and docking hazards and because of
increased leakage potential at the orbiter/module interconnect
fixture interface.
IN-BAY ROTATION DEPLOYED ROTATION DEPLOYED LINEAR
SHUTTLE
DETACHED
SEPARATE
LINEAR
Transfer Options for Typical
Tug Concepts
Table 3. Evaluation for Tug Propellant Logistics Elements
Safety Consideration
1. Number of critical operations
2. Number of failure effects:
a. On crew
b. On structure
3. Crew exposure to risks during normal operations
4. Attitude control capability of total
configuration
5. Impact control
6. Man compatibility
a. Tug
b. Propellant tank module
7. Communication control
8. Leakage control
Total
Overall Rating
Configuration
A
1
3
1 (A)
3
1
1
1
1
2
1
15
1
B
2
3
2
3 (C)
2
3 (E)
1
1
2
2 (H)
21
2
C
2
3
2
3 (C)
2
3 (E)
1
1
1
2 (H)
20
2
D
2
1
3 (B)
1 (D)
2
3 (F)
2 (G)
2 (G)
1
2 (I)
19
2
1 = best (A) Greater stability of configuration (E) Hard dock involved
4 = worst (B) Loss of remote control capability (F) Add rendezvous & docking
(C) Longer transfer time (G) Some subsystem not man-rated
(D) Orbiter at standoff during transfer (H) Flex hose in system
(I) Additional disconnects
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SAFETY EVALUATION OF FOUR CIS/RNS PROPELLANT TRANSFER CONCEPTS
The trade study conclusions and recommendations for the four CIS/RNS
propellant transfer concepts shown in Figure 9 and Table 4 are:
SEPARATE ROTATION
B
n.r?
DEPLOYED ROTATION SEPARATE LINEAR
\-i-r~7
CAPILLARY
Figure 9.
• Concept A,
separate
rotation, and
Concept B,
deployed rota-
tion, have
conditions of
ullage control
which result
from the e.g.
of the con-
figuration
falling
within the
CIS/RNS
tankage. For this reason, only Concept B was included in the
evaluation to provide a comparison for Concepts C and D.
• Concept C, separate linear, and Concept D, capillary, are both
acceptable concepts. The former concept is preferred for safety
reasons because of the state of the art with capillary systems.
SAFETY EVALUATION OF A MODULAR CIS/RNS CONCEPT
A modular CIS/RNS concept was evaluated (Figure 10 and Table 5) for
comparison with the fluid transfer concepts. The safety evaluation showed
that this is a competitive concept for modular users.
Transfer Options for Typical
CIS/RNS Concepts
LINE INTERCONNECT FIXTURE
DOCKING FIXTURE
ROTATES UP TO 90°
FOR DOCKING
LOCKING DEVICE
PROPELLANT TANK MODULE
DOCKED UP TO 90° TO CENTERLINE
OF LOGISTIC ELEMENT AND
ROTATED PARALLEL TO BOOM
LOCKING AT THE FORWARD
END OF TANK
Figure 10. Typical Modular Transfer Concept
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Table 4. Evaluation for CIS/RNS Propellant Logistics Elements
Safety Consideration
Number of critical operations
Number of failure effects:
A. On crew
B. On structure
Crew exposure to risks during normal operations
Attitude 'control capability of total configuration
Impact control
Man compatibility
CIS/RNS
Propellant tank module
Communication control
Leakage control
Total
Overall Rating
Configuration
Rotation
Concept B
. 3
3
3
2
3
2
1
1
2
2
22
3
Linear
Concept C
1
1
1
1
2
1
-
1
2
1
1
12
1
Capillary
Concept D
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
12
1
Table 5. Evaluation for Modular Concept, Propellant Logistics Elements
Safety Consideration
Number of critical operations
Number of failure efforts :
A. On crew
B. On structure
Crew exposure to risk during normal operations
Attitude control capability of total configuration
Impact control
Man compatibility
Communication control
Leakage control
Total
Overall Rating
Configuration
Modular Concept, CIS/RNS Type
3
1
2
1
1
1
Not applicable
1
2
12
1
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SAFETY EVALUATION OF ORBITER-TO-ORBITER PROPELLANT TRANSFER CONCEPTS
During orbital logistics operations, the shuttle orbiter may require that
its RCS or QMS propellants be replenished before deorbit is attempted. The
replenishment of propellants to the orbiter was evaluated from a system safety
viewpoint. One concept involved the use of flex lines attached to a manipulator
arm which connected the line to the airborne half of the ground fill-and-drain
quick disconnect of the orbiter (Figure 11). Other concepts considered
required the transfer of modular kits from one orbit to the other. The
principal conclusions are:
• Transfer of pro-
pellants through long
flex lines from one
orbiter to another to
the external fill-
and-drain disconnect
will eliminate the
potential hazard of
leakage in the cargo
bay.
• Use of long flex lines
will create hazardous
stowing problems and
will require heaters
to avoid line blockage
during transfer.
• Transfer of propellant kits from one cargo bay to the other will
increase the potential for impact damage to the orbiters.
• The additional preplumbed propellant lines to the interconnect fixture
in the shuttle orbiter cargo bay and the mating operation of the
propellant kits in the bay increase the potential for the leakage
hazard.
Figure 11. Orbiter-to-Orbiter Transfer
Concept
2.9 CONCLUSIONS
The system safety analysis was performed to determine the recommended
safety guidelines for implementing in-space propellant logistics operations,
Several major conclusions were formulated:
1. In-space propellant logistics operations can be performed safely
with storage and without storage concepts.
2. Propellant delivery directly to a user without storage is a safer
concept than with storage because of the reduced number of
critical operations.
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3. Nondeployment of the propellant tank module from the orbiter cargo
bay is the recommended safety concept for propellant transfer to
tug-type vehicles.
4. Deployment of a propellant logistics element from the orbiter cargo
bay for soft docking to another element should be accomplished with
a combination of the manipulator and rotational deployment mechanisms.
5. Modular transfer of propellants to modular users is a recommended
concept.
6. Rotational and linear accelerations during fluid transfer are both
safe concepts for propellant settling.
7. Fluid transfer from a propellant tank module to a small (tug-type)
vehicle may be performed safely with the orbiter attached or the
orbiter not attached.
8. Fluid transfer from a propellant tank module to a large (LSF, CIS,
or RNS) vehicle should be accomplished with the orbiter not attached.
9. The effect of disturbances resulting from fluid instability and their
effect on vehicle control systems during propellant logistics
operations is a potential residual hazard.
10. Large propellant leaks in space which solidify in the cargo bay will
sublime in a few hours if the bay is oriented for maximum heating.
11. Propellant leakage or venting in the cargo bay during deorbit
operations is a potential residual hazard.
12. Propellant logistics elements can be returned to earth safely in the
orbiter cargo bay if propellant leakage is within specification and
if the pressure relief capability provided for the tanks allows for a
rapid change of the liquid residual propellants to a gas without
exceeding acceptable tank pressures.
13. Uniformity and commonality of interface for docking, stowing, and
transfer operations between interfacing propellant logistics elements
(including orbiter) is required.
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3.0 SUGGESTED ADDITIONAL EFFORT
System safety analyses have identified areas requiring efforts that are
beyond the scope of the study. Because of the potential hazards associated
with these areas, resolution should be considered prior to space shuttle/
propellant logistics element integration.
DYNAMIC CONTROL OF VARIOUS MATED CONFIGURATIONS
Disturbances such as sloshing, impact, and fluid surface distortion are
present in propellant logistics operations. The effect of these disturbances
acting on various elements or combinations of docked elements cannot be fully
investigated without study of the coupling effects of the elements' structural
dynamics and RCS action when influenced by the disturbances in zero g. A
study is required to provide visibility on the sensitivity of these variables
during critical propellant logistics operations.
ZERO-G LEAK DETECTION
Zero-g leak detection devices and sensing techniques should be developed
for use with orbital propellant logistics operations.
LOW-THRUST RCS
A long-life, low-thrust RCS should be developed for safe linear acceler-
ation propellant settling operations.
ZERO-G PROPELLANT GAUGING
Random orientation of propellants (LH2, SH2, L02) in zero g requires a
study of quantity gauging techniques for propellant logistics tanks in orbital
use. The potential loss of tank thermal protective environment causing hot
spots makes this measurement a critical item for earth return of the tank
module in the orbiter cargo bay.
VAPORIZATION OF RESIDUAL PROPELLANTS
Sloshing of residual propellants against a warm wall of a tank in the
cargo bay during deorbit and landing could cause the fluid to flash to a vapor.
A transient analysis which considers the parameters influencing the residual
propellants in the tank should be conducted. The investigation should provide
design consideration relating to vent sizing, tank volumes, and residual
propellant quantities as a function of heat inputs anticipated for various
insulation efficiencies.
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